Has PAS become stronger after maiden win in Sabah?

PAS faces structural limitations in Sabah that cannot be wished away.

One question has echoed loudly after the 2025 Sabah state election: has PAS suddenly become stronger after winning its first-ever seat in Sabah?

The short answer is no.

The longer answer reveals even more: a single symbolic breakthrough does not translate into structural strength, political momentum or electoral viability in a state as complex, diverse and strategically unique as Sabah.

There is no denying that PAS’s victory in Karambunai is historic. For the first time, the Islamic party secured an elected presence in East Malaysia.

For PAS leaders, this was celebrated as a milestone, an opening into a region previously considered impermeable to their ideological approach.

But symbolism is not strategy. A foothold is not a fortress.

And one victory — however headline-grabbing — does not establish PAS as a significant force in Sabah’s political landscape.

Sabah remains a state where local identity and local parties dominate the political imagination.

In the 73-seat state assembly, the decisive performance of Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS), which returned with 29 seats, clearly demonstrated that voters preferred parties that are deeply rooted in Sabah’s socioeconomic challenges and its longstanding grievances over autonomy and development.

In this landscape, PAS’s single seat does not shift any coalition calculations, policy priorities or power dynamics. It is a solitary success, not a new era.

More importantly, the Sabah electorate did not suddenly embrace PAS’s ideological DNA.

The victory was driven by highly localised dynamics, including the strength of the candidate, specific constituency concerns, and fragmentation among competing parties. None of this suggests a groundswell of PAS support across the state.

Without replication in other constituencies, PAS’s win remains an isolated incident rather than an emerging trend.

Furthermore, PAS faces structural limitations in Sabah that cannot be wished away.

Sabah’s multi-ethnic, multi-religious demography does not easily lend itself to the brand of politics that PAS has long championed in Peninsular Malaysia.

Communities in Sabah respond to local development needs, land rights issues, inter-ethnic coexistence, and the complex interplay of Sabah–Putrajaya relations.

PAS cannot expect to simply transplant its Peninsular messaging and expect widespread acceptance. The political cultures of Kota Bharu and Kota Kinabalu are vastly different.

To become meaningfully stronger, PAS would need a stable and credible organisational base in Sabah — constituency service centres, community networks, grassroots machinery, and a leadership structure capable of translating national narratives into Sabah realities.

As of now, none of this exists at scale. One elected representative does not constitute the beginning of an institutionalised presence. It is merely the beginning of a test — one that may or may not lead to future gains.

Even the claim that PAS’s win signals greater future influence in East Malaysia does not hold up to scrutiny.

GRS has retained its dominance, Warisan continues to show resilience, while the role of Umno has been clipped by Sabahans. Only six out of Umno’s 45 candidates won — the party’s worst performance ever in Sabah.

PAS has no currency other than political Islam to hold its sway in Sabah anyway.

The defining issue is good governance and the ability to control the spiralling cost of living, which is not where PAS’s strength lies.

Indeed, most Sabah parties view PAS with caution, concerned about the introduction of a more ideologically rigid agenda that may not sit well with the delicate social balance in the state.

If anything, PAS must tread lightly to avoid backlash — something already evident from past controversies that ignited public discontent among Sabahans.

And there is a national context that further complicates PAS’s projected rise.

While PAS may retain influence in parts of the Malay heartland in Peninsular Malaysia, its coalition partner Bersatu is significantly weakened.

Their inability to function cohesively has hurt Perikatan Nasional’s ability to expand effectively nationwide. PAS can maintain discipline, but Bersatu is often beset by factional tensions.

The more Bersatu falters, the less effective the PN machinery becomes. And the more PAS appears dominant within PN, the more non-Malays — and even Sabah and Sarawak voters — worry about its obscurantist tendencies.

This fear is not baseless. PAS’s ideological rigidity has long made it a polarising force.

Many Malaysians fear a political landscape dominated by exclusionary rhetoric, governance conservatism, and cultural imposition.

Sabahans, with their pluralistic worldview and lived multiculturalism, are even more resistant to such tendencies. Thus, PAS’s perceived strength can easily trigger counter-mobilisation rather than support.

In short, PAS did not emerge from Sabah stronger. It emerged with a symbolic victory — and symbolism is not power.

Power in Sabah still belongs to coalitions that understand the state’s diversity, autonomy concerns, and complex centre–state relations.

PAS’s win may provide it with a talking point, but not a platform. A presence, but not prominence. A foot in the door, but not the keys to the room.

If PAS wants to genuinely grow in Sabah, it must build from the ground up: community by community, issue by issue, and relationship by relationship. Anything less, and this single victory will remain exactly what it is—an isolated anomaly in the political tapestry of Sabah.

PAS can claim a milestone. But it cannot claim momentum. And momentum, not milestones, is what builds real political strength.

The views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of FMT.