Geopolitics across time and space

WITH mere days between completing my two week trip across five cities in India, and then travelling to Germany, my train of thought was interrupted. I was just scratching the surface of how India’s huge diversity—of language, culture, religion, caste, class and ethnicity—is managed and tempered (or sometimes fomented) by state institutions and civil society.

Differences in physical geography and climate (at their extremes, 20 degrees Celsius separated Chennai and New Delhi, and the air in Bengaluru was unironically delightful) joined manmade contrasts. I spectated the casual way in which ancient temples and medieval monuments (most imposingly the Mughal masterpieces of the North) were constantly being brushed by tuk-tuks (called ‘autos’ in India) and crammed buses ferrying people between teeming neighbourhoods, bustling commercial centres and sometimes surprisingly serene campuses.

Amidst this frenetic energy, impossible to ignore, were the architectural and institutional legacies of empire. French influence in Puducherry gave a particularly idiosyncratic vibe, but it was structures built by and for the British that provoked the most. Often physically beautiful, their aesthetic acquires a mixed taste when reminded that they were relatively tiny investments of a regime that extracted vast resources for the benefit of foreign shareholders and administrators.

Indeed, I found Indian attitudes towards empire much more amplified than ours, perhaps because of the greater prestige and wealth of their original kingdoms, alongside the worse violence and repression they experienced.

Khazanah has recently reopened—with generally favourable reviews—the Sultan Abdul Samad building, inspired by British Raj architecture and built for offices of the British colonial administration. It’s often forgotten that the Straits Settlements comprising Malacca, Penang and Singapore used to be governed from British India until 1867, when it became a British Crown Colony in its own right.

Subsequently, the treaties of protection—signed amidst military coercion and economic carrots and sticks—were signed, like the more famous Pangkor Treaty of 1874, by my ancestors (Tuanku Muhammad of Negeri Sembilan in 1895 and Sultan Zainal Abidin III of Terengganu in 1910) directly with the Colonial Office representing Her Majesty’s Government.

The experience of traditional monarchies in India was varied, with the legendary Mughal Dynasty (who granted the East India Company the right to collect taxes on its behalf in the first place) suffering a most sad end at the hands of the British, others deposed or merged, while some survived and indeed thrived until post-World War II decolonisation first forced the princely states (most with Mughal origins themselves) to choose between India and Pakistan, and then later losing their legal recognition (but not, as I discovered, their social prestige and present-day involvement in party politics).

I reflected on the geopolitical differences that enabled the Malay Rulers to retain their thrones as constitutional monarchs within a parliamentary democracy as I travelled to Munich for the 62nd edition of the Munich Security Conference.

Among the many speeches I managed to witness in person was that of British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer in Munich, who, in contrast to its once powerful status in India and Malaya, signalled a greater desire to cooperate with Europe—“we are not the Britain of the Brexit years anymore”.

German Chancellor Merz had set the tone, rebutting American unilateralism and stressing the benefits of alliances between democracies. And although the speech by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio was more respectful to Europe compared to the one delivered by Vice President JD Vance last year, it was insufficient to assuage European leaders who universally declared greater solidarity with each other (particularly Denmark in relation to Greenland), as well as unstinting support for Ukraine.

Although the major events were well covered by the media, it was in the Side Events—attended by the thinkers, strategists and younger leaders—that I got a sense of how deep the sense of betrayal and resignation was. European trust in the USA has been mortally wounded.

And yet in their appeals to other countries in the room, many Europeans failed to see how their own record of hypocrisy—even after the days of empire—will damage them. I had no hesitation in joining other citizens from countries of the former British Empire in pointing out how, even if we want human rights and democracy and freedom, the European record (with the exception of certain countries) itself is unconvincing, particularly the inconsistency between Ukraine and Palestine.

And so, small and medium countries will likely navigate geopolitics with more pragmatism and less ideology. In this regard, “Malaysia did brilliantly in hosting the Asean Summit!”, I was repeatedly told, and I hope we emerge from the transatlantic rift with the institutions and principles that we cherish intact.

* Tunku Zain Al-‘Abidin is Founding President of the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs.